Cryptoeconomic systems, engineered.
An engineering firm for cryptoeconomic systems — we design the mechanisms, build working systems, and collaborate with other projects where the fit is clear.
What we do
Systems work first: declare the desired properties, design the mechanisms that enforce them, prototype in the open, and validate before scale.
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Market design
Primary and secondary venues, claim structures, bonding and conservation mechanisms, multidimensional pools — from requirements to enforceable rules.
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Mechanism & algorithm design
Incentive-compatible procedures: pricing, allocation, reputation, peer prediction, and revenue sharing that survive strategic behavior.
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Specification
Translate business, legal, and economic intent into formal mathematical and state-space specs that engineers can implement and auditors can check.
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Modeling & simulation
Analytical models and computational experiments (including cadCAD) to explore metrics, failure modes, and design alternatives before mainnet.
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Parameter selection & optimization
Choose and stress-test the knobs that make a system operable — liquidity, fees, issuance, thresholds — under social choice and operational constraints.
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Implementation & validation
Prototypes, educational deployments, and field experiments that make the design falsifiable — then iterate.
Selected engagements
A sample of past and ongoing work across DeFi, media protocols, and open market infrastructure.
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Trade mechanisms, system metrics, and implementation architecture for a multidimensional liquidity venue — analytical work plus modeling and simulation.
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Protocol design across IP production, reputation, and monetization — including truth-telling peer prediction for revenue sharing.
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Live venues and field experiments for event-contingent claims — used in teaching, research, and open demos.
Research
Peer-reviewed and working results under the practice — AMMs, bonding structures, and mechanism design. Full research page.
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Systematization of AMM-based DEX design: conservation functions, slippage, divergence loss, and security — from a multidimensional market-design engagement.
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Game-theoretic treatment of deflationary burn-and-mint economies and conditions that avoid collapse.
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Deposit-based defense analysis for block-withholding in Proof-of-Work mining pools.
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Discrete-event games and bonding curves as estimators of private signals — mechanism design meets control and simulation.
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Bonding curves as enforceable mechanisms and the configuration spaces they induce via conservation invariants.
Full list and citations: Google Scholar.
Community
Meetups, teaching, and talks across the token engineering and Ethereum ecosystems.
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Two proposed sessions for Cannes, April 2027 — a live mechanism design breakout, and a new collaborative session on AI-agent workflows in token engineering. Open for topic submissions now.
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Ongoing meetup series — hosting, curation, and local TE community since 2018.
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ETHCC, TE Academy, academic conferences, and European builder events (Zurich, Prague, Cluj, and others).
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Teaching
University courses and open educational series on token engineering process, modeling, and DeFi / AMM design.
Open demos
Current public venues — one slice of ongoing work, not the whole practice. All demos.
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Thin LMSR venue for event-contingent claims: wallet flows, collateral, roles, on-chain settlement.
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Same LMSR economics with Yes/No claims as ERC-20s — portable, composable positions.
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Secondary xy=k pools over outcome tokens. Swaps reassign ownership; they do not rewrite LMSR inventory.
About
Engineering firm for cryptoeconomic systems — we design and build working systems, and do collaborative mechanism and system design with other projects.
We design and build our own systems, and support other projects when the mechanism-design fit is clear — an entrepreneurial practice that ships working infrastructure, not theory for its own sake.
Contact
Email, Telegram, or LinkedIn — no open calendar.